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“WE DIDN’T CROSS THE BORDER; THE BORDER
CROSSED US”: INFORMAL SOCIAL
ADAPTATIONS TO FORMAL GOVERNANCE AND
POLICIES BY COMMUNITIES ACROSS THE
BERING SEA REGION IN THE RUSSIAN FAR
EAST AND UNITED STATES. 1
Sarah Roop *, Lilian Alessa*, Andrew Kliskey*, Maryann Fidel **
& Grace Beaujean**
ABSTRACT: Territorially isolated villages along the shores of the U.S. and
Russian Bering Sea live with stark political lines dividing a region that shares a
common history, heritage, and contemporary existence. It is also a region whose
environmental security is threatened by common changes occurring throughout
the area but for whom possible responses to these changes are shaped by the
policies and politics of the countries in which they reside. This paper is based on
the experience from an international observing network, the Community
Observing Network for Adaptation and Security (CONAS), which provides rare
insights on how political context, across the remote and unique region of the
Bering Sea, shapes the realities of a People and how informal social institutions
have adapted as a result.
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I. INTRODUCTION
A region culminating in the landless North Pole; a part of
eight nation-states, yet apart from those nation-states; the
Arctic region is a complex, variably defined area that has, until
recently, been largely ignored by much of the world. The
Arctic’s indigenous peoples have adapted to its harsh
environment over thousands of years, but only within the last
few centuries has the indigenous population been forced to
include the adoption of policies, politics, and cultures of
nations claiming sovereignty over northern Arctic lands. The
effect of these imposed borders has been different for the
distinct Arctic societies, with varying degrees of imposed
regulation based upon national perception and politics.
Although past politics are inseparable from the current
situation of remote populations in the Arctic, the focus of this
paper is to explore the role of the present borders and how they
affect remote populations, as well as analyze the effectiveness
of current international cooperation, governance options, and
community-based organizations arising from informal social
institutions in providing sustainable and secure livelihoods for
remote communities. We will focus upon the remote peoples of
the Bering Sea, which will be explored largely through the
policies of two nations, the United States and the Russian
Federation, and the work of the Community Observing
Network for Adaptation and Security (CONAS), an
international community-based observation network in the
Bering Sea. By examining the effects of recent politics, the past
and present realities faced by Arctic peoples will emerge along
with various forms of cooperation and governance in support of
adaptive capacity in this interdependent, fragile environment.
Ultimately the goal is to present an encompassing view of the
political influence of Arctic peoples within their respective
national context; to show a common determination to adapt to
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a changing way of life; and to demonstrate the exclusiveness of
an international community at times more receptive to help in
that adaptation, and at times more focused than ever on
exploiting the riches from an area becoming ever more
accessible.
A. The Arctic and its People
To discuss the Arctic, it is first necessary to define its
boundaries. While the Arctic is rationally defined by the Arctic
Circle, the useable definition of the Arctic is more arbitrary.
Because of this paper’s humanistic approach, the general area
determined within the AMAP definition will serve as the
boundaries of the Arctic. 2
Of the approximately four million people who reside in the
Arctic, about 400,000 are considered indigenous, 3 a number
which fluctuates, as do many other indicators in the Arctic,
according to the defined boundary of the region. 4 Ultimately,
the Arctic region is comprised mostly of non-indigenous
people. 5 For the purpose of this paper, when speaking of Arctic
indigenous peoples, it will be inclusive only of the population of
people who existed in the Arctic before those from more
Western traditions came. It is defined by those who share a
language, history, and culture that is different from the
dominant society. It is a group of people who have existed in
the Arctic outside of modern political and legal systems and
were enveloped within those systems without choice. When
addressing remote communities, this will be inclusive of both
indigenous peoples and those non-indigenous to the region
whom have made these communities their home and are
subject to the same climatic challenges.
Indigenous populations in the Arctic are not a single group.
They are diverse groups of small populations representing
hundreds of different social traditions with as many distinct
languages, unique histories, and cultural practices that have
2. ARCTIC MONITORING AND ASSESSMENT PROGRAMME, AMAP ASSESSMENT 2002:
HUMAN HEALTH IN THE ARCTIC 2–3 (2003).
3. JOHN MCCANNON, A HISTORY OF THE ARCTIC 292 (2012).
4. ROBBIE ANDREW, AMAP, SOCIO-ECONOMIC DRIVERS OF CHANGE IN THE ARCTIC 1,
20 (2014), http://folk.uio.no/roberan/docs/Andrew,%202014%20-%20tr9_aaca_scenarios
_2014.pdf.
5. Id.
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developed over time and, in the past century and a half,
responded to the Western culture with which each group of
people has come in contact. 6 What unites these peoples with
those non-indigenous to the region, is the relatively extreme
environment in which they live, a region largely ignored by
governing powers until its land and sea proved to be profitable.
Sovereignty was then assumed by modern nation-states, and
eventually, all indigenous populations of the Arctic were
affected in substantial ways which differed according to which
country’s border had subsumed them.
As borders were drawn across the Arctic, the residing
populations suddenly found themselves to be in unknown
territory. For some indigenous populations—notably the Sami
now of Sweden, Norway, Finland, and Russia, whose
livelihoods revolved around reindeer husbandry—fixed borders
in some areas meant the loss of their way of life. 7 For other
indigenous peoples, such as the Inuit of Greenland, being a
territory of Denmark and defined within its sovereignty meant
little regarding the physical border but would shape
indigenous societies through the policies imposed upon them. 8
Whether Aleut and Siberian Yupik in Alaska and Russia;
Athabaskan and Inuit of Alaska and Canada; Sami of
Eurasia—they all share resources that are tied to food security
and culture.
B. The Bering Sea and its People
The Bering Sea is home to a multitude of indigenous peoples
including: the Eastern Unangan Aleut; Western/Aktan
Unangas Aleut; Central Yup’ik; Siberian/St. Lawrence Island
Yupik; Inupiaq; Koryak; and Chukchi. Currently it is
estimated that there are around 100,000 living in Bering Sea
coastal communities. 9 Though peoples of the Bering Sea all

6. Jonathan D. Greenberg, The Arctic in World Environmental History, 42 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 1307, 132526 (2009).
7. See Patrik Lantto, Borders, Citizenship and Change: The Case of the Sami People,
1751–2008, 14 CITIZENSHIP STUD. 543 (2010).
8. See Ulrik P. Gad, Greenland: A Post-Danish Sovereign Nation State in the
Making, COOPERATION & CONFLICT 98 (2013).
9. Maryann Fidel et al., Subsistence Density Mapping Brings Practical Values to
Decision Making, in FISHING PEOPLE OF THE NORTH: CULTURES, ECONOMICS, AND
MANAGEMENT RESPONDING TO CHANGE 193 (Courtney Carothers et al. eds., 2012).
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have unique cultural traditions, histories, and languages, they
are connected through the shared resources provided by the
sea that are becoming more and more threatened by global and
and
increasingly,
industrial
environmental
change 10
11
development.
Despite current fixed locations of these peoples, movement
across the North Pacific, Bering, Chukchi, and Beaufort Seas
was common historically. During the Cold War, this fluid
transfer of people was legally restricted due to the
implantation of the “Ice Curtain.” 12 This made it such that
indigenous peoples from the same ethnic and cultural
background permanently residing on either side of the Bering
Sea were separated not just by the waves, but by fixed
international boundaries. This primarily affected the Eastern
and Western/Aktan Aleut, or Unangas and Unangan, as well
as the Siberian Yupik on St. Lawrence Island and the
Chukotka Peninsula. 13 Imposing borders on peoples of shared
cultural and ethnic heritage not only functioned as a barrier
between families and extended kinship networks, but it also
limited the exchange of knowledge, communication, and
observations, mechanisms which are critical to the emergence
and sustenance of informal social institutions. 14
C. Informal Social Institutions
Informal social institutions can refer to traditional culture,
personal networks, corruption, clan organizations, civil society,
and a wide variety of behavioral norms, such as perceptions,
values, and beliefs. While formal institutions refer to state
bodies (courts, legislatures, bureaucracies) and state enforced
rules (constitutions, laws, regulations), informal institutions

10. Jacqueline M. Grebmeier et al., A Major Ecosystem Shift in the Northern Bering
Sea, 311 SCI. 1461 (2013).
11. P. Holthus, C. Clarkin, and J. Lorentzen, Emerging Arctic Opportunities:
Dramatic Increases Expected in Arctic Shipping, Oil and Gas Exploration, Fisheries
and Tourism, 70:2 COAST GUARD J. SAFETY & SECURITY SEA 10, 12 (2013).
12. A. Hills, Melting the Ice Curtain between Russia and Alaska, BUS. COMM. REV.,
Dec. 1993, at 26.
13. RACHEL ROSE STARKS, JEN MCCORMACK & STEPHEN CORNELL, NATIVE NATIONS
AND U.S. BORDERS: CHALLENGES TO INDIGENOUS CULTURE, CITIZENSHIP, AND
SECURITY 73 (2013).
14. Id. at 73–77.
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encompass civic, religious, and other societal organizations. 15
Informal institutions tend to have socially shared rules that
are understood by all within a culture. 16 We propose that they
are a critical adaptive practice in the Arctic, which is
experiencing rapid social and environmental changes. For
example, common-pool resource problems have been solved by
voluntary organizations, which often arise from informal social
institutions.17 A common pool resource is defined as a “natural
or man-made resource system that is sufficiently large as to
make it costly to exclude potential beneficiaries from obtaining
benefits from its use.” 17 The large marine resource of the
Bering Sea can be defined as a common-pool resource.
An important mechanism that is integral in maintaining
natural systems in the Arctic and the Bering Sea is traditional
local knowledge (TLK) or “sustained intimacy with the land,
its flora, and its animal creatures derived from extraordinarily
close attention to the physical world, exquisitely fine-tuned
perception, and intuitive decision-making based on the lived
awareness of hugely complex empirical data and constantly
evolving and changing connections, webs and relationships.” 18
TLK often guides the emergence of informal institutions which
are adaptive and important not only for the survival of the
cultures of the indigenous peoples, but are also the foundation
for natural resource sustainability. TLK helped to preserve
small populations of subsistence based societies for thousands
of years, conserve plant and animal life, and maintain
communal traditions. 19
In the last fifty years, the remote communities of the Arctic
have been presented with an unprecedented challenge: a series
of dramatic climatic changes with consequences that affect the
delicate balance of human and nature in the Arctic

15. Gretchen Helmke & Steven Levitsky, Informal Institutions and Comparative
Politics: A Research Agenda, 2 PERSP. ON POL. 725 (2004).
16. Helmke and Levitsky go on to describe socially shared rules as rules that are
created, accepted, and enforced outside of official channels, and are often unwritten.
As formal institutions are openly codified, this distinction helps to differentiate
between formal and informal institutions.
17. ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS
FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION 30 (1990).
18. Greenberg, supra note 6, at 1330.
19. Id. at 1329.
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environment. 20 Changing temperatures bring with it a host of
challenges including rising sea levels, increased ultraviolet
radiation, decreasing sea ice, and melting permafrost.
However, some changes, such as decreasing sea ice, also imply
opportunities for new shipping routes and economic
development. 21 Changing climate in the Arctic also brings
about stresses that threaten the adaptive capacity of some
Arctic populations and their ecosystems, such as air and water
contamination, overfishing, habitat alteration, increased
pollutants from exploitative activities, and growing population
demands on the region. 22 Remote communities continue to link
TLK with scientific observations, allowing room for multiple
perspectives on the changes taking place that may lead to
more diverse adaptation strategies. Even at times when the
two sources for observations are not completely congruent,
meaningful insights may be drawn from discrepancies. 23
Overall, by incorporating different informal institutions into
both basic and applied scientific inquiry, a more complete
picture can be obtained.
II. FORMAL INSTITUTIONS
A. Arctic Borders
Borders are coming to mean even more in the Arctic region.
Prior to the turn of the century, the Arctic land had been a
stage for resource extraction, national sovereignty rights, and
military preparedness; the Arctic Sea was a scene for further
militarization. Now, however, the diminishing ice cap is
redefining the boundary of the Arctic in terms of shipping, oil,
and mining, 24 particularly when combined with ever-improving
technology to extract resources. In response to disputes over
national borders within the Arctic, the United Nations

20. SUSAN JOY HASSOL, ACIA, IMPACTS OF A WARMING ARCTIC: ARCTIC CLIMATE
IMPACT ASSESSMENT 8 (2004), available at http://www.acia.uaf.edu.
21. CHARLES EMMERSON, THE FUTURE HISTORY OF THE ARCTIC 274–81 (2010).
22. HASSOL, supra note 20, at 11.
23. HENRY HUNTINGTON & SHARI FOX, ACIA, THE CHANGING ARCTIC: INDIGENOUS
PERSPECTIVES 6466 (2004), available at http://www.acia.uaf.edu/PDFs/ACIA_Science_
Chapters_Final/ACIA_Ch03_Final.pdf.
24. Jeppe Strandsbjerg, Cartopolitics, Geopolitics and Boundaries in the Arctic, 17
GEOPOLITICS 818, 819 (2012).
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Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) was signed in
1982 and came into force in 1994, 25 allowing countries upon
ratification to extend their sovereign rights into maritime
areas following two main principles: the Exclusive Economic
Zone (EEZ) and the Continental Shelf. 26 The EEZ related
largely to fishing zones and allowed nations rights to all living
and non-living resources as far as 200 nautical miles from a
country’s juridical coastline. 27 The Continental Shelf refers to
the extension of a nation’s landmass into the sea and relates
directly to that nation’s sovereign rights to exploit the natural
resources found there. 28 All Arctic nations as well as 152 other
countries, with the exception of the United States, are parties
to UNCLOS. 29
Amongst the Arctic nations, most have prepared to increase
their presence in the region. Norway stated in 2005 that the
Arctic was a priority as a main strategic interest, and Canada
repeated claims to their Arctic presence. 30 The Russian
Federation has claimed extraction of Arctic oil as the
cornerstone in remaining an energy superpower. 31 While the
United States remains divided on further Arctic exploitation,
with politicians at odds over environmental concerns versus
energy independence, 32 one need not look further than the U.S.
Geological Survey’s Arctic petroleum assessment to see the
intent of future oil extraction. 33 Increasing tensions are
emerging as countries with the majority of arctic coastline,
Canada, Russia, and Norway, assert their rights to implement
potentially conflicting visions. Additional players such as
China, France, and Japan only add to uncertainties about
what arctic policies may be implemented in the future.
Presently, the reach of nation-states—their influence,
borders, and the actions they take regarding the Arctic
region—affect remote Arctic regions, as well as indigenous and

25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

EMMERSON, supra note 21, at 83.
Strandsbjerg, supra note 24, at 829.
Id. at 830.
Id. at 831.
Id. at 83.
Strandsbjerg, supra note 24, at 820–21.
EMMERSON, supra note 21, at 208.
Id. at 171–72.
ANDREW, supra note 4, at 14.

https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wjelp/vol5/iss1/4

8

Roop et al.: "We Didn't Cross the Border; the Border Crossed Us": Informal Soc

2015]“WE DIDN’T CROSS THE BORDER; THE BORDER CROSSED US” 77

non-indigenous peoples alike. The following discussion will
develop the recent historical context within the Russian
Federation (formerly the USSR) and the United States
regarding the relationship between indigenous societies and
nation-states. Approaching present day, the discussion will
come to include the entire population of remote communities,
the environmental challenges they face, and ultimately, the
informal governance arising from informal social institutions
that are developing out of necessity to allow these communities
to take part in policies, national and international, affecting
their adaptation to a changing environment.
Historically, the impact of nation-states taking interest and
enforcing borders in the Arctic influenced the entire structure
of remote indigenous societies. One defining example amongst
indigenous, Arctic populations that differentiates them from
non-indigenous is that they considered themselves sovereign
peoples. 34 Unlike the modern state, the borders of the
territories for which they claimed sovereignty were not defined
lines, but instead a fluctuating boundary necessitated because
of the more nomadic lifestyle demanded by the environment.
Hunters and gatherers, fishermen, and herders—indigenous
peoples throughout the Arctic—balanced a lifestyle according
to the ebb and flow of natural forces and found themselves illequipped when it came to knowing and respecting political
borders.
B. The Alaska-Russia Border
1. Historic Institutions on Each Side of the Border
The United States acquired Alaska from Russia in 1867,
simultaneously acquiring a dispersed population of about
60,000 indigenous peoples, at a time when the United States
Congress was ending its treaty making policies with Native
Americans and beginning an era of assimilation policies. 35
Alaska remained a military district until the Organic Act in
1884, which established the precedent for native claims to
land, and also treated Alaska Natives as United States citizens

34. Greenberg, supra note 6, at 1328.
35. Samuel Gottstein, An Era Of Continued Neglect: Assessing the Impact of
Congressional Exemptions for Alaska Natives, 55 B.C. L. REV. 1261, 1262 (2014).
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without separate sovereignty. 36
In contrast, Russia had a much more developed relationship
with its indigenous peoples by the turn of the twentieth
century. Tsarist Russia was well acquainted with the
indigenous population of the North, identifying them as the
Small Peoples of the North and encouraging Russian
settlement upon entering into the Industrial Revolution. 37 As
was the basis for Imperial Russian rule, customary law was
imposed upon indigenous communities to uphold judicial
norms, but this system of indirect rule allowed indigenous
communities to administer their affairs with minimal
interference from authorities. 38 While some communities were
hit hard by taxation and resource exploitation, such as the
Kamchatka region and the Far East, other indigenous
communities, notably the Chukchi, were able to remain
relatively autonomous and to diminish the impact of the
colonizing culture, economy, and religion being imposed upon
neighboring Arctic areas. 39
Following the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution, all regions of the
U.S.S.R. felt the effects of “Sovietization” as the Kremlin
sought out even the most remote communities to incorporate
into the national cause 40 and established rule over indigenous
populations. 41 By the late 1920s, all Arctic communities had
been brought under the umbrella of socialist collectivization
policies, meaning that all property was confiscated and became
the property of the State. More specifically, the State
expropriated and transferred the reindeer of Arctic
communities dependent upon them into larger herds, known as
Collective Farms, and drafted native shepherds into “reindeer
brigades.” Furthermore, the State quashed religious beliefs

36. Martha Hirschfield, The Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act: Tribal
Sovereignty and the Corporate Form, 101 Yale L.J. 1334, 1335 (1998).
37. MCCANNON, supra note 3, at 149, 151.
38. JOHANNES ROHR, IWGIA, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES IN THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION:
IWGIA REPORT 18, 17 (Diana Vinding & Kathrin Wessendorf eds., 2014).
39. See, e.g., Andrei A. Znamenski, “Vague Sense of Belonging to the Russian
Empire”: The Reindeer Chukchi’s Status in Nineteenth Century Northeastern Siberia,
36 ARCTIC ANTHROPOLOGY 19 (1999).
40. Greenberg, supra note 6, at 1358.
41. Andrei V. Golovnev, Indigenous Leadership in Northwestern Siberia: Traditional
Patterns and Their Contemporary Manifestations, 34 ARCTIC ANTHROPOLOGY 149, 156
(1997).
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and required children to attend boarding schools far from their
homelands. 42 This meant the combining of multiple
nationalities and the loss of traditional and social structures as
indigenous peoples were organized into Soviet collectives.
During the 1930s, the U.S.S.R. was organized into okrugs
(regions), which would eventually lead to the complete
dissolution of indigenous self-governance. 43
Three major legislative acts would come to shape today’s
indigenous populations in Alaska: The Alaska Statehood Act,
The Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (ANSCA), and The
Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act (ANILCA). 44
The Alaska Statehood Act of 1958 allowed the state to choose
approximately 104 acres of land not yet claimed as federal
land. 45 In 1971, ANSCA was passed, providing a one-time cash
settlement of nearly one billion dollars to some 78,000 Alaska
natives, along with forty-four million acres of public land. 46
The settlement and fee simple titles to the land were
distributed through twelve newly created regional Native
corporations and approximately 200 village corporations. 47
ANSCA extinguished aboriginal title to native lands and also
dispossessed Alaska Natives of 320 million acres of traditional
lands, including land on the North Slope. 48 The last Act,
ANILCA, was passed in 1980 and developed in response to the
unaddressed issue of subsistence rights. It gave people living
in rural places in Alaska priority to hunt and fish on public
lands. 49 It does not address Alaska Natives specifically and
excludes those who live in the few areas classified as urban,
allowing all who may be more reliant on subsistence living to
have subsistence rights.
The middle decades of the twentieth century constituted an
42. Petra Rethman, Deadly Dis-Ease: Medical Knowledge and Healing in Northern
Kamchatka, Russia, 23 CULTURE, MED. & PSYCHIATRY 197, 202 (1999).
43. Golovnev, supra note 41, at 156.
44. Wayne Edwards & Tara Natarajan, ANCSA and ANILCA: Capabilities Failure?,
17 NATIVE STUD. REV. 69, 82–83 (2008).
45. Id. at 82.
46. Lisa Drew, Here’s Your Land, Now Make Money, NATIONAL WILDLIFE (WORLD
EDITION), Dec. 91/Jan. 92, at 38, 39.
47. Edwards & Natarajan, supra note 44, at 83.
48. Jeffrey Aslan, Building Alaska Native Village Resilience in a Post-Peak World, 37
VT. L. REV. 239, 243 (2012).
49. Edwards & Natarajan, supra note 44, at 82.
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era of limited autonomy for the indigenous peoples of the
Arctic. Perhaps more importantly, these decades brought more
substantial change to their ways of life than at any other time
in history. 50 Yet, despite the social, economic, and political
transformations, traditional cultural practices exist today. 51
After the pressure to assimilate began to decrease, a revival of
culture and identity emerged, in a form that could
accommodate for modernity and globalization. 52 Indeed, in
every country where governments allowed for negotiations
regarding measures of autonomy and land claims, indigenous
peoples promptly presented coherent demands. 53
2. International Arctic Institutions
In 1989 Finland invited the eight Arctic states—the USSR,
the United States, Canada, Denmark, Iceland, Norway,
Sweden, and Finland—to Rovaniemi to begin talks on
cooperation and environmental protections in the Arctic. In
1991, the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy (AEPS)
was agreed upon, establishing four working groups: the Arctic
Monitoring and Assessment Program (AMAP), the
Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna (CAFF), the
Emergency Prevention, Preparedness and Response (EPPR),
and the Protection of Arctic Marine Environment (PAME).
AEPS was superseded in 1996 by the Arctic Council. 54
The Arctic Council consists of eight member states (as
previously listed); six Permanent Participants made up of
indigenous peoples Arctic-wide (the Arctic Athabaskan
Council, the Aleut International Association, the Gwich’in
Council International, the Inuit Circumpolar Council, the
Russian Association of Indigenous Peoples, and the Saami
Council); and a host of working groups (the aforementioned
plus the Arctic Contaminants Action Program (ACAP) and the

50. Yvon Csonka & Peter Schweitzer, Societies and Cultures: Change and
Persistance, in ARCTIC HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 45, 49 (Lassi Heininen & Chris
Southcott eds., 2004), available at http://www.svs.is/en/10-all-languages-content/28ahdr-chapters-english.
51. Greenberg, supra note 6, at 1329.
52. Csonka & Schweitzer, supra note 50, at 52.
53. Id. at 50.
54. Torbjørn Pedersen, Debates over the Role of the Arctic Council, 43 OCEAN DEV. &
INT’L L. 146, 148 (2012).
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Sustainable Development Working Group (SDWG)). 55 The
Arctic Council works to promote international cooperation and
coordination among Arctic States in environmental protection,
including the natural environment as well as the human
environment, and sustainable development, including use of
natural resources, economic development, and adaptive
capacity of local remote communities. 56
Nations continue to provide a governmental structure to the
Arctic largely based on mutual benefit and cooperation, and
the Arctic Council is as strong as ever, 57 displaying its ability
to adjust to high-level issues—such as melting sea ice,
international shipping, gas and oil exploitation, and migrating
fish stocks—that, for many, seemed beyond its capacity. 58
The Arctic Council is by definition a “high level
intergovernmental forum,” which operates on a different scale
than the Arctic communities living out the realities of these
transformations in their everyday lives—realities that often
transcend national borders. Indeed, an Arctic community may
have closer ties to communities in other parts of the Arctic
beyond the national borders that contain it, 59 and with similar
environmental conditions and culturally-tied peoples,
transnational communities within the Arctic may have more
relevant information to share with one another than with
other communities within its own nation. While the Arctic
Council provides an international voice, and nations’ policies
now generally work to provide increasing rights to these
communities, any legal framework that applies to
transnational peoples is not legally binding on nations. 60 The
United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous
Peoples (UNDRIP) comes closest to addressing such issues in

55. See ARCTIC COUNCIL (2014–2015), http://www.arctic-Council.org/index.php/en
(last visited May 16, 2015).
56. Waliul Hasanat, Diverse Soft-Law Cooperation Forms in the Arctic — Do They
Complement or Contradict Each Other?, 14 INT’L COMMUNITY L. REV. 173, 284–85
(2014).
57. Pedersen, supra note 54, at 152.
58. Timo Koivurova, The Arctic Council: A Testing Ground for New International
Environmental Governance, 19 BROWN J. WORLD AFF. 131, 137–38 (2012).
59. Hasanat, supra note 56, at 282.
60. Timo Koivurova, Sovereign States and Self-Determining Peoples: Carving Out a
Place for Transnational Indigenous Peoples in a World of Sovereign States, 12 INT’L
COMMUNITY L. REV. 191, 203 (2010).
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Article 36, stating: 61
1. Indigenous peoples, in particular those divided
by international borders, have the right to maintain
and develop contacts, relations and cooperation,
including activities for spiritual, cultural, political,
economic and social purposes, with their own
members as well as other peoples across borders.
2. States, in consultation and cooperation with
indigenous peoples, shall take effective measures to
facilitate the exercise
and
ensure
the
implementation of this right.
But even this proves to be insufficient as such communities
are encouraged to maintain contacts, yet UNDRIP still
maintains a framework of the sovereign nation-state within
which each community must function. 62 The United Nations
Nuuk Declaration goes further, recommending that nationstates take measures to guarantee indigenous peoples’ crossborder rights through legally binding conventions. 63 Yet a
recommendation does not compel compliance, nor does it
facilitate coordination between nations. So the question arises,
when the Arctic is narrowed down to specific localities, and
those localities traverse national borders, what structures are
in place to address the shared issues of a transnational region?
3. Formation of Regional Institutions
Internally, in the USSR at the breakup of the Cold War,
local and regional organizations that had been slowly forming
were seen as accessible political forums for individuals from
remote communities to approach with concerns ranging from
indigenous rights to more localized concerns regarding their
livelihoods and community conditions. 64 Local and regional
indigenous organizations would come to function under the
Russian Association of the Indigenous Peoples of the North
(RAIPON), which was established by the Congress of
61. Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, G.A. Res. 61/295, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/66/142 (Sept. 13, 2007).
62. Koivurova, supra note 58, at 210.
63. Nuuk Arctic Declaration on the World Conference on Indigenous Peoples 2014, 12
FOURTH WORLD J. 69, 74 (Winter 2014).
64. ROHR, supra note 38, at 24.
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Indigenous Small-Numbered Peoples of the North, Siberia and
the Far East held in 1989 and continuing thereafter every four
years. 65 This council structure made up of the regional
organizations formed a unifying nationwide decision making
body. 66 With national advocacy and recognition, indigenous
peoples could effectively be a part of the national and
international scene. Beyond RAIPON, other international
organizations were forming ties with Russian indigenous
peoples representing overlapping missions: the Saami Council
accepted the Russian Kola Saami Association as a member in
1992; 67 a Russian branch of the Inuit Circumpolar Council
Conference was opened; 68 and, most notably Aleut
International Association (AIA) combined with the Aleut
associations on the Russian side of the Aleutian Islands in
1998. 69 AIA became a permanent participant of the Arctic
Council in 1998.
Within the United States, Alaska Natives began to advocate
for tribal sovereignty in the early 1980s largely to be a part of
economic benefits from and decisions regarding extractive
developments taking place as well as taking part in affecting
hunting and fishing regulation. 70 While opposed by the state,
Alaska Natives were designated by the Department of the
Interior as recognized tribes in 1993, receiving the same
privileges, immunities, and powers as other tribes recognized
by the Federal Government. 71 Divided into regional
corporations and tribal villages, both local and regional tribal
governments speak for their people and also represent tribal
interests in co-managing national resource organizations such
as the Alaska Beluga Whale Committee, Ice Seal Committee,
Eskimo
Walrus
Commission,
and
Alaska
Nanuuq
72
Commission. Alaska has tribal membership in four major
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 24–25.
70. Gottstein, supra note 35, at 1265.
71. Aslan, supra note 48, at 247.
72. JOEL P. CLEMENT, JOHN L. BENGTSON & BRENDAN P. KELLY, INTERAGENCY
WORKING GRP. ON COORD. OF DOM. ENERGY DEV. AND PERMITTING IN ALASKA,
MANAGING FOR THE FUTURE IN A RAPIDLY CHANGING ARCTIC: A REPORT TO THE
PRESIDENT (2013).
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organizations in the Arctic Council: the Arctic Athabaskan
Council (formed in 2000 and made up of Alaskan and
Canadian Athabaskan), the Aleut International Association
(registered in 1998 made up of Alaskan and Russian Aleuts),
the Gwich’in Council International (established in 1999 and
made up of Alaskan and Canadian Gwich’in communities), and
the Inuit Circumpolar Council (founded in 1978 and
representing Inuit from Canada, Alaska, Russia and
Greenland). 73
The end of the Cold War between the United States and the
former USSR marked a time when Arctic indigenous
organizations could finally take root in a landscape caught in a
stalemate between the two influential nations. Prior to the end
of the Cold War, forms of cooperation were stymied not only
from the Arctic’s stifled position during the military build-up,
but also from a lack of recognition of the Arctic as a region: it
was not generally recognized as a political or geographical
destination in the international arena constituting
international cooperation. 74 Yet, it is speculated that
cooperation in the form of soft-law bodies is exactly the kind of
governance the Arctic needs: its very nature lending itself
more readily to adaptation as it involves a much wider
spectrum of international players and forms of knowledge than
does formal law and policy. 75
III. INFORMAL INSTITUTIONS
Formal governance is often based on government-sponsored
data. However, these data either: a) are not trusted, b) do not
reflect the plurality of social contexts on the ground, or c) are
incomplete and lack social context particularly at local scales. 76
In order to develop more comprehensive and reliable ways of
knowing, community-based observation networks (CBONs) are
emerging as a powerful tool in enhancing local to regional
73. See ARCTIC COUNCIL (2014–2015), http://www.arctic-Council.org/index.php/en.
74. Lassi Heininen & Heather N. Nicol, The Importance of Northern Dimension
Foreign Policies in the Geopolitics of the Circumpolar North, 12 GEOPOLITICS 133, 137
(2007).
75. Hasanat, supra note 56, at 298.
76. Marc J. Hetherington & John D. Nugent, Explaining Public Support for
Devolution: The Role of Political Trust, in WHAT IS IT ABOUT GOVERNMENT THAT
AMERICANS DISLIKE? 134–38 (John R. Hibbing & Elizabeth Theiss-Morse eds., 2001).
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social adaptation. A CBON is a distributed array of human
sensors in communities throughout a region who are able to
observe their environments on a regular basis and, in this
capacity, are capable of detecting events that indicate whether
the environmental system is operating unusually. 77 As
demands on common-pool resources, such as the industrial and
environmental pressures found in the Bering Sea, increase,
cooperative institutions arising from informal institutions
which are governed and organized by resource users may be
especially effective in advancing conservation goals. 78
Successful common-pool resource governance by local actors is
dependent upon many factors. Some of these factors include:
conditions that allow local leaders and harvesters to selforganize effective rules, effective communication and trust
among users, sharing of common knowledge of the resource
and cultural use, and users placing high value on the
sustainability of the resource. 79 Similarities are found across
indigenous science practices (which incorporate TLK)
throughout the Bering Sea regarding cultural resource use
patterns, and the value attached to maintaining indigenous
ways of life that revolve around the health of the Bering Sea is
extremely high. The United States-Russian border has
disrupted effective communication and trust but informal
institutions are developing that facilitate positive interaction,
re-building camaraderie, discourse, and sharing “lessons
learned”.
A. Community-based Observation Networks arising from
Informal Social Institutions
In the past, nations have built policy, at least in theory, on
scientific consensus related to issues of conservation,
mitigation, adaptation and economy—a top-down approach to
addressing issues in the Arctic. 80 Nation-states determine how
77. L. Alessa et al., The Role of Indigenous Science and Local Knowledge in
Integrated Observing Systems: Moving Toward Adaptive Capacity Indices and Early
Warning Systems, SUSTAINABILITY SCI. (2015) DOI: 10.1007/s11625-015-0295-7.
78. OSTROM, supra note 17.
79. Elinor Ostrom, “A General Framework for Analyzing Sustainability of SocioEcological Systems,” 325 SCI. 419, 419–22 (2009).
80. Tero Mustonen, Rebirth of Indigenous Arctic Nations and Polar Resource
Management: Critical Perspectives from Siberia and Sámi Areas of Finland, 14(1)
BIODIVERSITY 14, 19–27 (2013).
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to best govern the region in accordance with international legal
obligations and governance institutions; the ultimate voice is
that of the eight nation-states. 81
The need for alternative governance models within the
Arctic have begun and have been employed. Increasingly,
innovative practices within governance are developing in the
Arctic that work to include local and indigenous voices in
decision-making and research. 82 Skepticism toward nation-led
governance has emerged, viewing top-down approaches as
paternalistic and outside-imposed change as counterproductive in the Arctic. 83 This view arises from the growing
challenges faced by Arctic communities presented by everevolving desires by various nations to exploit natural
resources, and incites discussion on developing a governance
model based on a bottom-up system. 84 Such a system would
rely upon a polycentric approach to governance that depends
more heavily upon informal institutions over formal ones,
favors non-state actors over state actors, and regulates
through soft law organizations rather than hard law. 85
As with nations’ governance decisions, Arctic communities
are similarly not flawless in assessments of actions to be
taken. Criticism of contemporary Arctic communities includes
unsustainable hunting practices, overgrazing of pastures, and
a willingness toward development of natural resources for
economic advancement. 86 A change in governance models is
simply a call for more decision-making to include local
observatories, to develop forums for the exchange of views and
knowledge in a meaningful way 87 and to create policy
conditions that facilitate sustainable practices.
Local informal institutions that contribute to governance
come about in communities both organically and through
81. Koivurova, Arctic Council: A Testing Ground for New International
Environmental Governance, 19 BROWN J. WORLD AFF. 131, 132 (2012).
82. NORDEN, ARCTIC HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT: REGIONAL PROCESSES AND
GLOBAL LINKAGES 25 (Joan Nymand Larsen & Gail Fondahl eds., 2015).
83. Csonka & Schweitzer, supra note 50, at 64.
84. Mustonen, supra note 80, at 20.
85. Giliberto Capano, Jeremy Rayner & Anthony R. Zito, Governance from the
Bottom Up: Complexity and Divergence in Comparative Perspective, 90 PUB. ADMIN.
56, 65 (2012).
86. Mustonen, supra note 84, at 4.
87. Id. at 3.
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organized cooperation as issues requiring attention are
identified. Informal governance refers to customary standards
of conduct that allow for flexible non-codified forms of
interaction, 88 and is characterized by a lesser degree of
institutionalization, cooperation on an ad-hoc basis, and less
complex decision making processes and agreements. 89
Examples of informal governance in the Arctic can range from
more organized forms, such as the Alaska Nanuuq Commission
which is a native group representing 15 Alaska villages that
works with the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service to advance the
conservation of polar bears, 90 to governance that stems from
more cultural norms. Local communities form the roots of
informal governance and its structure is embedded with the
existing informal social institutions such as customs,
traditions, rules of conduct and beliefs within a community.
Acting as a forum for many forms of informal governance,
the Arctic Council functions as a bridge between formal and
some of the more organized informal forms of governance and
is itself a soft-law institution. As mentioned previously, the
Arctic Council goes a long way in giving indigenous peoples
(though not necessarily actual communities) an international
voice with the status of Permanent Participants. This allows
representatives of indigenous groups to bring issues and
concerns to the table in developing best practices for the
region. The Arctic Council presents an effective method of
bottom-up solutions that has played an increasingly important
role in Arctic governance. 91 However, within the Arctic Council
indigenous peoples take a back seat to national actors and
organizations because they carry no vote, nor does the Arctic
Council have the power of enforcement, and it generally leaves
sensitive issues such as territorial questions and fishing rights
out of discussion. 92 Despite these limitations, the Arctic

88. Jan van Tatenhove, Jeannette Mak & Duncan Liefferink, The Inter-Play between
Formal and Informal Practices, 7 PERSP. ON EUR. POL. & SOC'Y 8, 12–13 (2006).
89. Colette de Roo et al., Background Paper: Environmental Governance in the
Marine Arctic, ARCTIC TRANSFORM, 4 September 2008, at 18, available at
http://arctic-transform.org/download/EnvGovBP.pdf.
90. See ALASKA NANUUQ COMMISSION, http://thealaskananuuqcommission.org/.
91. SCOTT NICHOLAS ROMANIUK, GLOBAL ARCTIC: SOVEREIGNTY AND THE FUTURE OF
THE NORTH 69–70 (2013).
92. MCCANNON, supra note 3, at 282.
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Council’s full potential is yet to be discovered 93 and the Arctic
Council itself is ever-evolving to meet the needs of a fastchanging Arctic. 94
Adding to the methods of research used increasingly by softlaw organizations, 95 information gathered by local people can
include generational, and geographically and temporally
specific knowledge, inclusive of the social context of
environmental and global change. 96 As a result, by including
TLK, geographical sensitivity is narrowed, cultural sensitivity
is heightened, and perhaps most importantly, the specific
needs of a community are identified to help design specific
adaptation strategies. 97
To further explore the role of CBONs in emergent informal
social institutions, we will focus on selected villages within the
Bering Sea region correlating with the study area of CONAS.
This region, shared by the northeastern portion of the Russian
Federation and the state of Alaska, is inhabited by diverse yet
similar remote communities, which emerged from separate
political contexts to face interrelated concerns for adapting to a
changing environment. CONAS has partnered with eight
indigenous communities bordering the Bering Sea in both the
Russian Federation and Alaska, including those of the
Siberian/St. Lawrence Island Yupik of the Bering Strait
Region, and the Aleut/Unangax of the Aleutian Islands, both of
which historically had extended family relations crossing over
the present Russian-US border. A closer look at the use of
CBONs to explore transnational trends and bring TLK to the
forefront with potential to affect both informal governance by
facilitating communication and the exchange of ideas, and
national policy through bridging forums, such as the Arctic
Council, becomes more clear.
It is the historic political separation between the Russian
Federation and the United States that adds a unique aspect to
the Arctic communities separated by the Bering Sea. As
93. ROMANIUK, supra note 91, at 70.
94. See ARCTIC COUNCIL, http://www.arctic-Council.org/index.php/en/.
95. Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Hard and Soft Law in International
Governance, 54 INT’L ORG. 421, 450 (2000).
96. Jonathan Andrew Ignatowski & Jon Rosales, Identifying the Exposure of Two
Subsistence Villages in Alaska to Climate Change Using Traditional Ecological
Knowledge, 121 CLIMATIC CHANGE 285, 296 (2013).
97. Id. at 297.
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described earlier, the realities of peoples existing in similar
environmental conditions and developing like means of selfsustaining lifestyles, were affected by the political context of
the nation in which each community resided. When relations
between the two nations began to normalize and
communication and cooperation between Russian and Alaskan
communities could formally take place, a plethora of relevant
knowledge was discovered.
B. Community Observing Network for Adaptation and Security
(CONAS)
CBONs have the less inhibited ability to fill a multi-faceted
role of coordinating observing for the development of shared
adaptation strategies that nation-states are as yet unprepared
to coordinate on. Through a regionally focused lens, they
explore issues relating to natural resources and environmental
security. 98 These topics are addressed not as a national
inquiry, but as local ones, impartially expanding to
transnational concerns as necessary. The unique local
perspectives that are attained through informal institutions,
such as observations from CBONs, can be used immediately to
help direct local governance, formal and informal, and also
have potential to play a larger role in overall national and
international policy regarding the Arctic and providing
expanded means of adaptability. The direction of the research
is guided by community leaders toward areas of interest and
concern, the data are gathered by community members while
quality control and data management occurs in partnership
with universities and non-governmental organizations in order
to create scientifically justifiable data products such as maps,
and peer-reviewed reports. 99 In addition, CBONs create
98. Arctic security issues in this sense relate not to military security but focus most
commonly on food security. Security can also include economic, cultural and, in the
case of the Arctic, land security. All of these aspects must be sustainable in order to
ensure a prosperous community. In the Arctic, these securities are tied to finding
appropriate informed adaptation methods for mitigating the impact of eventual
changes occurring in the far North. For a summary of threatened securities, see
Gunter Weller, Summary and Synthesis of the ACIA, in ARCTIC CLIMATE IMPACT
ASSESSMENT 990 (2005), available at http://www.acia.uaf.edu/PDFs/ACIA_
Science_Chapters_Final/ACIA_Ch18_Final.pdf.
99. VICTORIA GOFMAN & MARYANN SMITH, BERING SEA SUB-NETWORK PILOT PHASE
FINAL REPORT (2009), available at https://oaarchive.arctic-council.org/handle/11374/
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opportunities for community members and leaders to have
face-to-face discussions about issues affecting their
communities and how they may act on new knowledge.
The importance of thoroughly documenting information on
the borders of transnational areas can be exemplified in recent
efforts involving peoples on both the Russian and Alaskan
sides of the Bering Sea. Common concerns reveal themselves,
through monitoring of subsistence species in the Bering Sea as
a priority concern amongst villages situated remotely on its
shores, 100 or, conversely, revealing entire areas central to
communities’ daily lives that are not represented in the
changing social, political and environmental climate. 101
In a recent study using data collected by CONAS, maps were
created to compare seasonal use areas, lifetime use areas and
“calorie-sheds” of specified communities in the Bering Sea
ecosystem. The interest in defining these areas stems from
concerns of potential impact of industrial activity and shipping
routes on subsistence species, as well as effects of climate
change. The maps were a result of combining biological data
with data based in local systematic observations. When
comparing the three mapping techniques produced by
analyzing data based on different temporal scales the extent
and nature of human use of the environment within across
borders was resolved. From seasonal use area maps,
awareness of the dynamic nature of subsistence patterns can
be used to plan for and mitigate disturbances in the immediate
future according to current seasonal conditions and can be
used to track change over time; lifetime use areas result in a
more comprehensive indicator of potential conflicts to be used
in planning and regulation; the calorie-shed mapping, defined
as where the food consumed in a community may have come
from, extends the area of influence for each community even
farther
beyond
current
and
historic
use
areas.
Comprehensively, mapping out the full temporal range of the
relationship between local communities and the species that
206.
100. Maryann Fidel et al., Walrus Harvest Locations Reflect Adaptation: A
Contribution from a Community-Based Observation Network in the Bering Sea, 37
POLAR GEOGRAPHY 48, 55 (2014).
101. Susan A. Crate, Elder Knowledge and Sustainable Livelihoods in Post-Soviet
Russia: Finding Dialogue across the Generations, 43 ARCTIC ANTHROPOLOGY 40, 49
(2006).
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are most important toward that community’s food security
provides a potential opportunity for locals—decision makers
and individuals alike—to evaluate whether and how outside
activity in both nations might affect harvested species. 102 In
this context CBONs are able to contribute the best possible
science based on TLK which may inform informal governance
and may turn informal practice into a formal policy over time.
At first glance, the scope of this study seems quite specific,
and rightfully so. In the study cited above, the Alaskan
communities of Gambell, Savoonga and Togiak were chosen as
case studies because of harvest data available. 103 It represents
a small piece in the puzzle of intricate relationships that occur
within the complex Arctic ecosystem. CBONs like CONAS fills
a niche in understanding pan-arctic issues as its coverage area
spans the Bering Sea representing communities on both
Russian and Alaskan sides. Similarities between the
communities include dependence upon a subsistence-based
lifestyle from the Bering Sea as each community is not
connected to a road system thereby making store-bought food
less available and expensive. 104 However, the region affecting
these communities easily extends over national maritime
borders presenting a clear interrelatedness between the
transnational resources.
C. Shared Beringian Heritage Program
There have been strides by both nations to improve
cooperative efforts in substantial and innovative ways. One
example of this is the Shared Beringian Heritage Program,
which is a shared expanse of land envisioned as a
transboundary protected area. Beringia, an area consisting of
both land and sea that was once the land bridge between the
Asian and North American continents, which includes
102. Henry P. Huntington et al., Mapping Human Interaction with the Bering Sea
Ecosystem: Comparing Seasonal Use Areas, Lifetime Use Areas, and "Calorie-Sheds,"
94 DEEP SEA RES. PART II: TOPICAL STUD. OCEANOGRAPHY 292 (2013).
103. Huntington et al., supra note 102, at 294. The availability of subsistence
harvest data developed during the Bering Sea Project directed the choice of villages
used in the BSSN study. See also James A. Fall et al., Continuity and Change in
Subsistence Harvests in Five Bering Sea Communities: Akutan, Emmonak, Savoonga,
St. Paul, and Togiak, 94 DEEP SEA RES. PART II: TOPICAL STUD. OCEANOGRAPHY 274
(2013).
104. Fidel et al., supra note 100.
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Northeastern Russia, Alaska and a part of Northwestern
Canada, provides an unparalleled opportunity for study of the
ecology, archaeology, and cultural heritage. 105 While a
transboundary protected area has yet to become full reality
and its future is affected by fluctuating political climates,
collaboration toward such an effort has continued since the
mid-1980s, showing a promising cooperation amongst these
two nations. 106
D. Bering Strait Messenger Network
Other forms of communication to assist adaptation have also
occurred in the region. The Bering Strait Messenger Network
(BSMN) is a product of the recognized need for transnational
communication outside of national structures. Hosted by the
Institute of the North, BSMN provides a topic of discussion
monthly open for all interested to call in to listen or
participate. Past topics have included, improving Arctic
communications, food security, increased Arctic activity,
Native language retention and many more topics of interest.
Exemplifying the different political and economic cultures
under which these groups have developed, and how increased
communication can help facilitate successful adaptation the
meeting in April 2014 was devoted to sustainable Arctic energy
and clearly demonstrated the different environments of the
two nations and the desire to learn from each other. While the
State of Alaska has spent $200 million on renewable energy in
the past six years working to develop wind, geothermal,
hydroelectric and solar energy options to take the place of
diesel energy, Russia has invested much less in alternative
energy sources relying instead on individual diesel generators
and central power plants. Interest in developing alternative
energy sources exist, but high costs and uncertainty about
methods inhibit exploration. However, developing geothermal
energy is a technique gaining interest in Chukotka, especially
with the example set in Alaska. 107 On the other side, Russia
105. See Shared Beringian Heritage Program, U.S. NAT'L PARK SERVICE,
http://www.nps.gov/akso/beringia.
106. Id.
107. INSTITUTE OF THE NORTH, DRAFT MEETING MINUTES: BERING STRAIT
MESSENGER NETWORK MONTHLY THEMATIC MEETING (April 18, 2014), available at
https://www.institutenorth.org/assets/images/uploads/general/BSMN_April_Meeting_
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has focused development into nuclear energy and has
expanded its nuclear energy program since 2006, looking to
double its nuclear capacity by 2030 and reduce gas power
energy. 108 Communities in Alaska would like to learn more
about the use of nuclear energies from their neighbors in
Russia. 109
E. Culture Camps
The Urban Unangax̂ Culture Camp is another example of
community-based cooperation amongst the peoples of the
Bering Sea. Sponsored by the regional non-profit tribal
organization Aleutian Pribilof Islands Association (APIA), the
yearly Urban Culture Camp brings together youth and adults
from the greater Aleutian Islands region to participate in
hands-on cultural activities and promote camaraderie amongst
the Aleut community. This resurgence of Native pride has
increased in the past decades to rekindle cultural heritage
suppressed during the prior period dominated by Russian and
American influence. 110 Today, fewer than a dozen Unangax
communities remain within Alaska, which still hosts the
majority of Unangax with some 1,700 of the roughly 3,000
tribal members worldwide. Nikolskoye, a community on Bering
Island in the Commander Islands of the Russian Federation, is
home to 300 Unangax, who the Russians took to the island in
the early 1800s. 111
All of the previously mentioned programs share increased
communication and camaraderie across a border that has
historically hindered relationships. Effective communication is
essential in achieving solutions to shared challenges in
resource use 112 and can facilitate a sharing of lessons learned
Minutes.pdf [hereinafter DRAFT MEETING MINUTES].
108. SUZANNE OXENSTIERNA & VELI-PEKKA TYNKKYNEN, RUSSIAN ENERGY AND
SECURITY UP TO 2030, 150 (2014).
109. DRAFT MEETING MINUTES, supra note 108.
110. See APIA, http://www.apiai.org/.
111. See History, APIA, http://www.apiai.org/culture-History/history/ (includes a
condensed version of “Unangax: Coastal People of Far Southwestern Alaska,” a
chapter written by Dr. Douglas Veltre to be published in Alaska’s First Peoples. Dr.
Veltre has conducted archaeological and ethnohistorical research in the Aleutian and
Pribilof islands since 1971.).
112. Elinor Ostrom, Coping with Tragedies of the Commons, 2(1) ANN. REV. POL. SCI.
493 (1999).
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while residents are actively adapting. Despite dominance by
the powerful nation-states, the remote peoples of the Russian
Federation and Alaska are developing their own ways to share
information, revitalize culture, and come together in a unified
voice to affect the kind of change they want to see. In terms of
adaptation, with the goal of thriving in place, this kind of
participation is paramount.
IV. FACILITATING EMERGENCE OF INFORMAL
INSTITUTIONS
Remote Arctic communities are emerging to form a collective
set of voices that extend beyond the borders that have recently
defined them. In the Bering Sea region, peoples of the Arctic
share common histories linking their future securities and
their abilities to adapt in a rapidly changing environment.
Identifying opportunities and vulnerabilities faced by these
communities allows for proactive, rather than reactive,
adaptive responses and the co-production of accurate scientific
knowledge, informed by indigenous science, that will aid policy
makers and community leaders in developing responsible and
equitable Arctic policies.
In an age where forms of communication and
complementing forums exist, remote communities have more
opportunity than ever to take larger roles in the future
securities of their homelands. Envisioning an Arctic without
borders for the purpose of best meeting the needs of the Arctic
social-ecological system amidst a changing environmental and
geopolitical climate may not be realistic given our world
political context, but local and soft-law entities have
persistently taken larger roles in the pan-Arctic scene, and
their contributions are becoming ever more numerous. The
peoples of the Bering Sea region rely on their abilities of
observation for their livelihoods, allowing for detailed and
complex descriptions of local ecosystems through ingrained
and generational knowledge. 113 By incorporating this
invaluable knowledge into other forms of information
gathering and by understanding the means to improve
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adaptive capacity, vulnerability analysis of this and other
regions can offer better visions of a coordinated Arctic at both
local and global scales. 114
A recent effort to facilitate the coordination of informal
social institutions is the Arctic Adaptation Exchange Portal
(AAEP), which was one of the products of the Canadian
chairmanship of the Arctic Council. While several websites are
dedicated to arctic issues, the AAEP aims to be accessible to
communities “at tundra level.” More specifically, efforts are
underway to provide datasets necessary to meaningfully
respond to change on a day-to-day basis, as well as to provide a
virtual exchange to share lessons learned and to better
communicate with policy-makers.
During the U.S. chairmanship (2015-2017), through the
Arctic Council’s Sustainable Development Working Group, the
AAEP will be further developed as an online space where
communities from across the circumpolar north can meet
online to access and share adaptation resources and
knowledge:
“Coming together is a beginning. Keeping together
is progress, Working together is success.” – Henry
Ford
Without question, isolated Arctic communities are shaped by
their history, influenced by their recent past, directed by
current political structures, and changed by the changing
landscape that dominates the activities of their lives.
Adaptability, both of Arctic communities through the
emergence of cooperative efforts arising from informal social
institutions and the policies and actions of nations, will
determine the resilience of all involved. Ideally this will chart
a course for a future Arctic that is based on collaboration
rather than conflict.
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